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ABSTRACT
This study examines whether the fiscal multiplier can be negative
for certain types of government spending. The key result is that
the  fiscal  multiplier  can  be  negative  if  there  is  a  high  degree  of
substitutability between private and government consumption and
government consumption is complementary to leisure.
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1 Introduction
The ability of scal policy to stimulate aggregate output has recently returned
to the forefront of the economic policy debate due to the large scal stimulus
packages implemented in China, Europe and U.S. to ght the global recession.
Expansionary scal policy is often, but not always seen as a good way to
mitigate the negative e¤ects of a slump in global demand and as a key factor
in economic recovery.
The e¤ectiveness of scal policy, however, has been a topic of heated
debate between economists who believe that temporary scal expansion is in
a severe recession an appropriate means of tackling the problem of insu¢ cient
aggregate demand and those economists who share the Treasury View. The
Treasury View dates back to the 1920s and 1930s when the sta¤of the British
Chancellor of the Exchequer opposed the ideas of Keynes.1 According to the
Treasury View:
"each extra pound sterling of British government spending
had to be nanced by borrowing an extra pound from Britains
savers, which meant a pound less for Britains rms to invest.
Hence investment plus government spending was constant. So s-
cal policy could never boost employment or production no matter
what" DeLong (2009b, 1).
The Treasury View has been recently rediscovered by Fama (2009) and
Cochrane (2009), as noted e.g. by Krugman (2009). Fama (2009) writes:
"despite the existence of idle resources, [...] stimulus plans do not add to
current resources in use. They just move resources from one use to another."
Cochrane (2009) argues "[e]very dollar of increased government spending
must correspond to one less dollar of private spending" and that "[t]he base-
line question is whether the [scal] multiplier exceeds zero".
However, in virtually all micro-based macro models with intertemporally
optimizing households, the scal multiplier is positive. The standard chan-
nels that imply a positive scal multiplier are the wealth and substitution
e¤ects of scal policy on the labour supply. An increase in government spend-
ing makes households poorer due to higher taxes reducing private consump-
tion. This increases the marginal value of private consumption leading to
households to substitute work for leisure.
This paper examines whether the scal multiplier can be zero or even neg-
ative in a micro-based macro model. The standard preferences are extended
in two ways to make the substitution e¤ect (from leisure) weaker. Firstly,
1See DeLong (2009a).
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government consumption is assumed to be a complement or a substitute for
private consumption. The earlier literature has shown that substitutability
between private and government consumption reduces the scal multiplier.2
Secondly, government consumption can be either a complement or a sub-
stitute for leisure. Complementarity between government consumption and
leisure would mean that an increase in government spending increases the
value of leisure, encouraging households to reduce heir labour supply.
The key result is that the scal multiplier in the present model is negative
only in the special case where both the marginal rate of substitution between
private and government consumption and the complementarity between gov-
ernment consumption and leisure are su¢ ciently high. The intuition behind
the negative scal multiplier is that the substitution e¤ect, from the labour
supply to leisure, is strong enough to o¤set the wealth e¤ect.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 discusses whether the scal multiplier can be negative. Section 4
concludes.
2 The model
In this section a simple model is set out, in order to discuss the possibility
of a negative scal multiplier. Consider an economy with many identical
households and identical rms. The utility function of a household is given
by3
U = log(C + G)  1
1 + 
G1 N1+ + V (G): (1)
Here C (G) denotes private (government) consumption,   1 is a measure of
the substitutability/complementarity between private and government con-
sumption, N is the labour supply,   0 the labour supply parameter, and
 indicates whether government consumption is a complement or substitute
for labour supply. The term V (G) is added to the utility function so that
the marginal utility of government consumption is always non-negative.
The utility function implies that
@(@U=@C)
@G
=  (C + G) 2; (2)
@(@U=@N)
@G
=  (1  )G N: (3)
2See Barro (1981, 1989), Finn (1998), Ganelli (2003), Heijdra and Ligthart (1997),
Roche (1996) and Tervala (2008)
3The utility function used in Fernandez et al. (2004) is similar to the present utility
function.
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Equation (2) shows that if  is positive (negative) government consump-
tion reduces (increases) the marginal utility of private consumption, imply-
ing substitutability (complementarity) between private and government con-
sumption. Equation (3) shows that, depending on whether  is greater or
smaller that one, government consumption is a complement or substitute for
the labour supply. Alternatively, one can say that if  < 1 ( > 1), gov-
ernment consumption is a complement (substitute) for leisure, implying that
an increase in government consumption increases (decreases) the marginal
value of leisure. If  = 1, the model corresponds to the standard case, where
government consumption does not a¤ect the value of leisure.
The budget constraint is
PC = wN   P; (4)
where P is the price of the commodity, w is the nominal wage rate,  denotes
real lump-sum taxes. The government budget constraint is simply  = G.
The household solves a maximization problem, choosing the levels of con-
sumption and labour supply so as to maximize utility. The resulting labour
supply equation is
N =
w
P (C + G)G1 
: (5)
Equation (5) shows that the labour supply depends not only on the labour
supply parameter, the real wage and e¤ective consumption(dened as C +
G), but also on . The term G1  indicates that if government consumption
is a substitute (complement) for leisure, then government consumption tends
to increase (reduce) the labour supply.
The production function of the rms is simply
Y = N: (6)
The zero-prot condition means that the price is equal to the nominal wage,
P = w: (7)
Aggregate demand in the economy is given by
Y = C +G: (8)
3 The scal multiplier
For simplicity, the model is log-linearized around a zero government spending
steady state. The four equations that determine the ve variables (N;C; Y; P;W )
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are the log-linearized versions of (5), (6), (7) and (8). The nominal wage is
chosen as numeraire (w = 1).
For the log-linearized versions of the key equations, the scal multiplier
is
Y^ =

  
1 + 

G^: (9)
In this equation percentage deviations from the initial equilibrium are de-
noted by hats: Y^ = dY=Y0, where the zero subscript denotes the initial
equilibrium value. Because initial government spending is zero, it is normal-
ized by private consumption (G^ = dG=C0).
Equation (9) shows that an increase in government spending can increase
or reduce output, depending on the relative magnitudes of  and . If the
degree of substitutability between private and government consumption is
high (high ) and the degree of the complementarity between government
consumption and leisure is high (low ), then an increase in government
spending reduces output. Equation (9) also replicates the common nding
in the scal policy literature that if  = 0,  = 1 and  = 1, then the scal
multiplier is 0.5.
Important channels of inuence on the scal multiplier are the standard
wealth and substitution e¤ects. An increase in government spending renders
the household poorer, due to higher taxes which reduce private consump-
tion. This increases the marginal value of private consumption, inducing the
households to substitute work for leisure. In the standard case, where  = 0
and  = 1, the e¤ects lead to an increase in the labour supply such that the
scal multiplier is positive but not greater than one, unless the labour supply
is perfectly inelastic ( =1).
If utility is a function of e¤ective government consumption(dened as
G), the strength of the substitution e¤ect also depends on the substitutabil-
ity/complementarity between private and government consumption. As em-
phasised by Ganelli and Tervala (2009), if the complementarity between pri-
vate and government consumption is high, the scal multiplier can be greater
than one. This is because an increase in government spending increases the
marginal utility of private consumption and hence produces a stronger sub-
stitution e¤ect.
The main point of this paper is, however, to discuss the possibility that
the scal multiplier is negative. If private and government consumption
are substitutes, then an increase in government spending reduces the mar-
ginal utility of private consumption, weakening the substitution e¤ect. The
higher the substitutability between private and government consumption, the
smaller the scal multiplier.
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If government consumption is a complement to leisure ( < 1), an increase
in government spending naturally  increases the value of leisure and so
reduces the willingness of the households to supply labour. This channel is a
part of the substitution e¤ect of the labour supply and it therefore reduces
the scal multiplier. In fact, if the substitutability between private and
government consumption is a su¢ ciently high and government consumption
is at the same time a su¢ ciently "good complement" (i.e.  is low) for leisure,
then scal multiplier is negative. This is due to the fact that the substitution
e¤ect, from work toward leisure, more than o¤sets the wealth e¤ect.
Table 1 shows the dependence of the scal multiplier on the interplay
between  and , assuming  = 1. The empirical literature seems not to
be conclusive as to a plausible value of . Kormendi (1983) and Aschauer
(1985) found that it is about 0.2 in the U.S. Kwan (2006) found that in
East Asia (on average) it is between 0.5 and 1. Karras (1994), on the other
hand, found that private and government consumption are complements. Not
knowing the appropriate value of , the value is chosen somewhat arbitrarily
to highlight the dependence of the scal multiplier on whether government
consumption is a complement or substitute for leisure.
Table 1
The dependence of the scal multiplier on  and  ( = 1).
 =  0:5  = 0  = 0:5  = 1
 = 0:5 0.5 0.25 0 -0.25
 = 1 0.75 0.5 0.25 0
 = 1:5 1 0.75 0.5 0.25
4 Conclusions
The main point of this paper is to analyse the question of whether the scal
multiplier can be negative for certain types of government spending. The
paper gives a positive answer in the case that government spending is devoted
to goods that are substitutes for private consumption and complements to
leisure. It is, however, di¢ cult to see how government consumption can
be a perfect substitute for private consumption, in a such way that only
government consumption is a complement to leisure. A limitation of this
model is that taxes are non-distortionary. The introduction of distortionary
taxes would strengthen a possibility of a negative scal multiplier.
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